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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HUBER ~ ROWLAND CONSTRUC-
TION Co., 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE, 
Defendent and Respondent 
Case No. 
8766 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 22, 1954, appellant entered into a con-
tract with respondent, in which appellant agreed to 
perform certain work for respondent, consisting prin-
cipally of construction of sidewalk, curb and gutter, 
the said project being known as South Salt Lake Spec-
ial Improvement District #'5. All of the work re-
quired by the contract to be performed by appellant was 
completed by Sept. 12, 1955, including the removal 
of 64,904 square feet of old sidewalk as required by 
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2 
the contract. The price agreed to be paid for the per-
formance of the said work was the contract unit bid 
price per item, as shown in the Proposal, for the 
quantities of work actually performed. The contract, 
and contract documents specifically made a part of the 
contract, including the Proposal, Instructions to Bid-
ders, and Specifications, were received into evidence 
and designated as part of the record on this appeal. 
The Proposal includes the bid price for all of the work 
to be performed, except that it does not specifically 
include an item for sidewalk removal. Respondent 
contended that the item of "Structural Excavation" 
included the removal of old sidewalk. The Specifica-
tions define "Structural Excavation" as follows: 
STRUCTURAL EXCAVATION 
2.4.1. Description. Structural excavation 
shall include the performance of all operations 
incidental to the excavation of earth and rock, 
of whatever kind, for structures on this project. 
It shall include backfill and embankment of ex-
cavated material, the disposal of all material not 
required, or not suitable for backfill or embank-
ment, and the cleanup and restoration of sur-
faces except as hereinafter specifically provided. 
It is appellant· s contention that an i tern of sidewalk 
removal was omitted from the Proposal either through 
inadvertence or mistake, and that no price being agreed 
upon for such work, it is entitled to a reasonable price. 
On Sept. 6, 1956, appellant commenced an action in 
the District Court for the Third Judicial District, 
State of Utah, for payment for the removal of such old 
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sidewalk alleging that a reasonable price was 5¢ per 
square foot, or a total of $3,245.20. Trial was held 
on Sept. 20, 19 57 in the District Court, the court 
sitting without a jury. The trial court found that 
payment of $600.75 for sidewalk removal was made 
to appellant at the rate of 75¢ per cubic yard, the 
contract price for structural excavation, for 801 cubic 
yards, the equivalent of 64,904 square feet of 4-inch 
sidewalk. The trial court further found that there 
is no trade practice or custom in the construction in-
dustry requiring a construction of the contract differ-
ent from, or in modification of, the written contract, 
and found as a matter of law, from a construction of 
the contract, that the sidewalk removal was a part of 
the excavation work covered by the contract. Accord-
ingly, the trial court entered judgment for the respond-
ent, no cause of action, on the First Cause of Action, 
for the removal of the old sidewalk. The trial made 
no findings of fact on the other issues as set out in 
the Pre-Trial Order on the First Cause of Action, as 
to whether or not there was an accord and satisfaction, 
or the reasonable price per square foot for the removal 
of the old sidewalk. 
Appellant accepts the findings of fact of the trial 
court as being correct, but believes that the conclu-
sions of law from a construction of the contract are 
incorrect, and since the Judgment on the Second Cause 
of Action and defendant's Counterclaim are not ap-
pealed from, the only issue presented to this Court on 
this appeal is, therefore, whether or not the trial court 
erred in construing the contract, concerning payment 
for sidewalk removal. 
------~~ ~- ------------
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN ITS INTERPRETA~ 
TION OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT 
AND RESPONDENT, ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF 
LAW THAT THE SIDEWALK REMOVAL WAS APART 
OF THE EXCAVATION WORK COVERED BY THE 
CONTRACT. 
ARGUMENT 
The first question to be disposed of is, does the 
definition of "Structural Excavation'' include there-
moval of man-made concrete structures. The specifi-
cations quoted above, page 2, state that structural ex-
cavation shall include the performance of all opera-
tions incidental to the excavation of "earth and rock" 
of whatever kind. The term "rock" is defined in Web~ 
ster's International Dictionary, 2nd Edition as: 
3. Geol. Solid mineral matter of any kind 
occuring naturally (emphasis added) in large 
quantities or forming a considerable part of the 
earth's mass; also, a particular mass or kind of 
such material. Rock may be consolidated or 
unconsolidated, and composed of one mineral 
or, more commonly, of two or more; or it 
may be to a greater or less extent of organic 
origin, as coal . . .. 
In City of Chicago v. Duffy, 117 Ill. App. 26 L 
the court said "The term 'rock' in ordinary language is 
the stony matter which constitutes earth's crust as 
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distinguished from clayt gravet sandt peat, etc.u To 
the same effect is Okey v. Moyes, 91 NW 771, 117 
Iowa 514. 19 Encyclopedia Britannica 364t 14th Edi-
tion, says: 
''Rockt in geology a mass of the mineral 
matter of which the crust of the earth is com-
posed. In more general usage a 'rock' is a large 
mass of this mineral matter, as distinguished 
from smaller pieces, 'stones' ". 
From the foregoing citations, it is too clear to war-
rant further discussion that the term "rocktt does not 
comprehend man-made concrete sidewalk. 
Nevertheless, the trial court found that payment 
was in fact made for sidewalk removal at the price 
agreed upon for structural excavation, and found as 
a matter of law, that the contract provided that such 
sidewalk removal was a part of such excavation. It 
is difficult to understand upon what basis such a 
conclusion could be reached. 
If the removal of the old sidewalk was not in-
eluded in any of the items scheduled in the Proposal, 
it becomes necessary to determine if it was the intent 
of the parties, as found in the contract, that no pay-
ment should be made for any work required by the 
contract, but not specifically included in any of the 
items in the Proposal. 
It is important here to distinguish between minor 
details and work incidental to other prescribed work, 
and wholly separate work which is not incidental to 
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other work. For example, it would be understood by 
everyone that where it is prescribed that a certain con-
crete structure be constructed, that incidental to such 
work would be the erection of forms necessary to pour-
ing the concrete. But this is quite a different thing from 
simply prescribing the construction of a concrete struc-
ture, and then contending that major excavation to 
establish a proper elevation for the structure is inci-
dental to this work, particularly where excavation is 
separately provided for. It is the latter situation at 
issue here. The removal of old sidewalk was neces-
sary to establish proper grades for the new sidewalk, 
and the only provisions for payment for structural 
excavation so define structural excavation as to ex-
pressly exclude sidewalk removal, so that it cannot 
be contended that the sidewalk removal was incidental 
to such work. 
If it were the intent of the parties, however, there 
would be no problems or difficulties in a contract 
which might provide, for example, that the contractor 
shall do excavation, remove trees, and construct side-
walk, and that for such excavation, removal, and con-
struction, the contractor should be paid so much a 
yard for excavation actually done and nothing extra 
for the tree removal and sidewalk construction. In-
deed, there is language in this contract, which if read 
alone, could be construed to mean that payment of 
such work as is listed in the Proposal shall constitute 
payment for all work whether or not listed in the 
Proposal. But from a reading of the contract as a 
whole, it is clear that no such basis of payment was 
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contemplated. Nor do the pleadings or findings by 
the trial court indicate that such a basis of payment 
was intended. (Note that Par. 5, First Cause of 
Action of respondent's Answer states that "defendant 
alleges that the 'Proposal' as contained in said written 
Contract set forth the items, description, quantity, unit 
price and total amount for the various portions of the 
work to be done under the terms of the Contract.n 
Again in Par. 8, "defendant alleges that the sidewalk 
removal as a part of the excavation work covered by 
the Contract was included within the terms of the 
Con tract.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The specifications cover in minute detail what 
work is to be performed under each item in the Pro-
posal, and the items in the Proposal include every single 
item of work required to be performed under the con-
tract with separate provisions for extras or force work, 
with only one exception-there is omitted a bid item 
for sidewalk removaL Nowhere does the contract give 
notice or warning to the bidders that if any work to 
be performed other than minor details and incidental 
work is excluded from the Proposal, that such work 
must be done without extra compensation. Nor has 
respondent ever aserted that such was the intent of 
the parties, but on the contrary, attempted to satisfy 
this obligation by making payment on the basis of 
the price to be paid for excavation of earth and rock. 
From reading of the contract as a whole, and 
from the pleadings and findings by the trial court, 
one fact becomes unmistakably clear, and upon which 
appellant's cause of action is predicated-that is, that 
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it was the intent of the parties, both appellant and res-
pondent, that the schedule of bid items should include 
all work to be done under the contract (except for force 
work which is separately provided for and except for 
minor details and incidental work). The conclusion 
is inescapable that the removal of old sidewalk was 
omitted, either from the definition of structural ex-
cavation or as a separate bid item in the Proposal, 
either through inadvertence or mistake. 
It is stated in 13 C.J. 271 "A contract, it may 
truly be said, includes not only what the parties ac-
tually write down or say, but all those things which 
the law implies as part of it, and likewise all matters 
which both the parties intend to express but do not'', 
citing In re Pierce, etc., Mfg. Co., 231 Fed. 312, 320; 
E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 
218 Fed. 353, 134 CCA 161, and many others. A 
discussion in Mace v. Cole, 50 N.D. 866, 198 NW 
816. 35 A.L.R. 1391, is particularly apropos. This 
was a case in which plaintiff was attempting to es-
tablish a lien under a lien law which allowed such 
liens only where the "price agreed upon is definitely 
fixed'' and the court, in holding for the plaintiff even 
though no specific price was stated, said: 
It does not follow from the mere fact that 
the parties did not mention a definite price for 
the threshing that a price was not agreed upon. 
For a contract includes not only what the par-
ties say, but also what is necesarily to be im-
plied from what they say. Grossman v. Schen-
ker, 206 N.Y. 466, 469, 100 NE 39. What is 
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implied in an express contract is as much a 
part of it as what is expressed. Bishop on Con-
tracts (2d Ed.) Sec. 241; 13 C.J. 2 71. See, 
also, sections 5915-5917, C.L. 1913. Thus, 
in sales of personal property, not infrequently 
the agreement in terms states merely that one 
party will buy or that he will sell certain goods 
without stating any correlative obligation on 
the part of the other party. Williston on Con-
tracts, p. 154. In such case the law supplies the 
promise on the part of the purchaser to pay the 
purchase price. If the parties have by any course 
of dealing made it possible for a reasonable man 
in their position to understand their intention 
as to the price, it will be fixed by this under-
standing, based on previous course of dealing 
as effectually as if stated in words. Williston 
on Sales, Sec. 167. But, where the facts and 
circumstances are such that it must be said 
that the parties did not fix a price at all, or 
provide any mode for ascertainment thereof, 
the law implies a stipulation that the seller shall 
sell at, and the buyer shall pay, a reasonable 
price. Williston on Sales, Sec. 16 6, 1 71. 
Consistent with the foregoing is the statement 
of this Court in Cummings et ux v. Nielson et al, 42 
Utah 157, 166, 129 P. 619. This Court said ''It 
is a cardinal rule of construction that that which is 
implied is always as much a part of any writing as 
that which is expressed", and citing 2 Page on Con-
tracts, sec. 1118, "Since a contract is to be construed 
as a whole, terms which can be inferred from a con-
sideration of the entire instrument are as much a part 
of the contract as if expressly set forth therein". It 
is appellant's contention that one of the "terms which 
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can be inferred from a consideration of the entire in-
strument" is that payment is to be made for all major 
work required by the contract, and that if no unit 
price is shown in the Proposal, a reasonable price shall 
be paid. In any case, the law implies that a reason-
able price shall be paid in sueh circumstances. 
There are only three possible hypotheses that 
could account for the omission of sidewalk removal 
from the Proposal. 1-The respondent, through in-
advertence, simply failed to make any provision for 
the price to be paid for this work. 2.-The respondent, 
erroneously, believed that sidewalk removal was in-
cluded in the definition of structural excavation. 3.-
The respondent deliberately failed to make any pro-
vision for payment for sidewalk removal with the 
hope of getting something for nothing. In either of 
the first two situations, it is clear that the parties in-
tended that the appellant should be paid for this work 
and the foregoing statements of law being applicable, 
appellant is entitled to recover a reasonable price. Under 
the third possibility, which appellant does not believe 
to be the correct one, even if the contract were con-
strued to mean that no payment was to be made for 
work excluded from the Proposal. such a contract 
would obviously constitute a fraudulent attempt to 
mislead and deceive the bidders. In such a case, the 
law is clear that appellant would be entitled to reform-
ation of the contract to conform to what the appellant 
was fraudulently induced to believe it to be. 45 Am. 
Jur. 613, Reformation of Instruments, Sec. 51 et seq. 
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If it had been the intent of the parties to include 
sidewalk removal as part of the excavation, there 
would have been no reason to specifically show on 
the plans what sidewalk was to be removed. 
Although the plans showed what old sidewalk 
was to be removed, and appellant is chargeable with 
knowledge that such work had to be done, since there 
was no place to enter a bid for this work in the Pro-
posal, and since the Specifications (Sec. 1.2.1 and 1.2.3, 
infra page 13) indicate that no change is to be made in 
the Proposal, and since the contract is a unit price 
contract based on the quantities of work actually done 
rather than a lump-sum contract, any reasonable per-
son would certainly be entitled to believe that this 
item was omitted through error and that payment 
would be made therefore at a reasonable price or at a 
price subsequently to be agreed upon. Support for this 
belief is found in Sec. 1.2.8, "The bidder's attention 
is called to the fact that the quantities of work to be 
done and materials furnished under these specifications 
as shown in the proposal are approximate only and 
are for the purpose of comparing bids and fixing the 
amount of bonds and that payment will be made only 
on the basis of the above unit prices in the actual 
quantities, as determined by the Owner's Engineer in 
the completed work. tt 
If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity in the 
contract in this regard, or if there remains any doubt 
as to the intention of the parties, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of appellant. 
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In Monnett vs. Monnett, 46 Oh. St. 30, 34, 
the court said: 
The words of obligation in a contract are 
interpreted most strongly against the obligor 
for it is presumed that he used those most favor-
able to his interests; and all doubtful terms or 
ambiguous words are to be construed against 
him. He who speaks should speak plainly, or 
the other party may explain to his own ad-
vantage. 
Numerous similar statements are to be found in ci-
tations in Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, sec. 
37. 
The following statement from Williston on Con-
tracts, Sec. 621, citing many causes, is of particular 
significance: 
Since one who speaks or writes, can by 
exactness of expression more easily prevent mis-
takes in meaning, than one with whom he is 
dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of lan-
guage are resolved in favor of the latter ... 
This rule finds frequent application to policies 
of insurance which are ordinarily prepared sole-
ly by the insurance company, and the words, 
therefore, are construed most strongly against 
it. 
Appellant believes that what is said about in-
surance companies is, equally applicable in the case 
of most construction contracts. The contract is pre-
pared solely by the owner or his engineer and the con-
tractor has no voice whatever in the terms of the con-
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tract-he must take it as he finds it or not at all. In 
this contract, Sec. 1. 2.1 of the Specifications provides 
"The bidder must submit his proposal on the form 
furnished by the Engineer. All blank spaces must be 
filled in correctly where indicated for each item where 
a quantity is given ... ", and again in Sec. 1.2.3 
"Proposals may be rejected if they show any omissions, 
alteration of form, additions not called for, condition-
al or alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind." 
(Emphasis added.) 
CONCLUSION 
It was the intent of the parties that the bid 
schedule in the Proposal should comprehend all of 
the work required to be done by the contract, and 
that a bid item for removal of old sidewalk was 
omitted through inadvertence or mistake, and that 
since no price was agreed upon for this work, appellant 
is entitled to a reasonable price. The trial court there-
fore erred in its determination that as a matter of law, 
the sidewalk removal was included in the provisions 
for structural excavation, and that the Amended 
Judgment of the trial court for the respondent on 
the First Cause of Action should be reversed with a 
new trial granted for the determination of the re-
maining issues concerning accord and satisfaction and 
determination of a reasonable price per square foot 
for sidewalk removal. 
R. J. RIMENSBERGER 
Attorney for Appellant 
404 Dooly Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, U tab 
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